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I A DUTY TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH
The dispute in a recent Supreme Court of Appeal case, Southernport
Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd,1 concerned a term in a contract which
gave one party an option (in the event of a separate condition not being
fulfilled at a future date) ‘to lease the properties . . . on the terms and
conditions of an agreement . . . negotiated between the parties in good faith
and approved by each party’s board of directors’.2 A further clause in this
agreement provided that should the parties be unable to reach agreement on
the outstanding terms in the future, these were to be submitted for decision
by an arbitrator.3 It was held by the Supreme Court of Appeal that this
deadlock-breaking provision was sufficient to take the contract in question
beyond the realm of being an unenforceable agreement to agree.4 Rather the
court held that
‘[t]he second agreement had settled all of the essential terms between the parties
and was immediately binding, although fuller negotiations to settle subsidiary
terms were still within the contemplation of the parties, in accordance with the
continuing relationship between them. Simply put, the arbitrator was entrusted
with putting the flesh onto the bones of a contract already concluded by the
parties’.5
The Southernport Developments case was thus simplified by the presence of a
deadlock-breaking mechanism in the parties’ own contract. Indeed, with
reference to a similar Australian case,6 Ponnan AJA distinguished two further
scenarios: first, where ‘by reference to a readily ascertainable standard, the
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1 2005 (2) SA202 (SCA).
2 Ibid para 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid para 17.
5 Ibid.
6 Coal Cliff Collieries (Pty) Ltd v Sijehama (Pty) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 1.
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court may be able to add flesh to a provision which is otherwise unacceptably
vague or uncertain or apparently illusory’.7 Secondly, where ‘the promise to
negotiate in good faith will occur in the context of an ‘‘arrangement’’ (to use a
neutral term) which, by its nature, purpose, context, other provisions or
otherwise makes it clear that the promise is too illusory or too vague and
uncertain to be enforceable’.8 The first scenario above was not discussed
further in the case, although Christie in his textbook on South African
contract law shows with reference to several cases that this too might avoid
the pitfalls of being an unenforceable agreement to agree.9 The second
category of cases above was unenforceable, according to Ponnan AJA,
because of the ‘absolute discretion vested in the parties to agree or disagree’.10
There is thus clear authority in South Africa that a provision in a contract
imposing on the parties a duty to negotiate further terms in good faith is
enforceable, provided an arbitration clause is included. This paper will take
the inquiry a step further. What if there is no deadlock-breaking mechanism?
There will be an assumption here that the duty to negotiate in good faith is
contained in some form of binding preliminary agreement, otherwise such a
term would fall into the second category of cases sketched above, which
would appear to be unenforceable. Thus the grey area of the first category of
cases will be explored, with reference to a general set of facts. Consider the
following scenario:
• Two contracting parties have reached a preliminary agreement which is
binding and which imposes on them a set of contractual obligations.
• Certain open terms in the agreement remain to be resolved, however.
These are intended to flesh out the agreement at a later date.
• The preliminary agreement states that these open terms will be negoti-
ated between the parties in the future in good faith.
If the contractual relationship between the parties breaks down at a later
date and one party refuses to continue with negotiations, can the other seek
redress for this breach of the preliminary agreement?
II AGREEMENTS TO AGREE IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
What should be clear from the above discussion of the finding in Southernport
Developments is that there are different classes of agreements to agree in South
7 Southernport Developments supra note 1 para 16. The quoted extract comes from
Coal Cliff Collieries supra note 6 at 27A.
8 Ibid. The quoted extract comes from Coal Cliff Collieries supra note 6 at 27B.
9 R H Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 38. See in particular
NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC & others; Deeb & another v ABSA Bank
Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA); Soteriou v Retco
Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 (2) SA 922 (A) at 931–4; Erasmus & others v Senwes Ltd & others
2006 (3) SA529 (T) at 537–8.
10 Southernport Developments supra note 1 paras 11 and 16. The case authority given
for this finding is Premier, Free State & others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA
413 (SCA).
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African law.11 In the case of Southernport as well as in another leading
Supreme Court of Appeal case, Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms)
Bpk,12 a binding preliminary agreement which contained open terms as to
the conditions of a future lease of defined property (Southernport), or an
option to renew a lease at a rental to be negotiated (Letaba Sawmills), was held
to be valid, given the existence of an arbitration provision.13
In the absence of a binding preliminary agreement, the present state of
South African law is more in favour of the party attempting to resile from
negotiations. In Premier, Free State, & others v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd14 a
letter of acceptance by the respondents which attempted to place an
obligation on the appellants to negotiate further was held not to constitute a
binding contract and that the terms it contained were in any event an
unenforceable ‘agreement to agree’.15 The term in the acceptance letter
attempting to impose this obligation vested absolute discretion in the parties
to agree or disagree, and hence did not bind.16 A similar finding was reached
in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd.17 There a clause in an
ongoing supply agreement to the effect that the parties could increase the sale
price from time to time by mutual agreement was held to be unenforceable.18
The parties had reached a stalemate over a proposed price increase and in the
absence of agreement over the future sales price, the court declined to
enforce the agreement at the appellant’s request.19 The Appellate Division
thus refused to supply a reasonable price.20
The dispute in CGEE Alsthom Equipments et Enterprises Electriques, South
African Division v GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd21 concerned the validity of a telex
message to the respondent which confirmed an earlier oral award of a
contract to it. The appellant was constructing the nuclear power station at
Koeberg in the Western Cape and the respondent was to supply steel
guttering to support electric cables at the plant. The appellant orally
confirmed that the contract had been given to the respondent and requested
that it order steel in the meantime. The respondent, however, demanded that
this acceptance be placed in writing, which prompted the telex from the
appellant. Ultimately negotiations broke down between the parties, after the
steel had been ordered, but before performance had taken place. The dispute
11 For a discussion of issues surrounding agreements to agree, particularly with
regard to pre-emption contracts, see Deeksha Bhana ‘The contract of pre-emption as
an agreement to agree’ (2008) 71 THRHR 568.
12 1993 (1) SA768 (A).
13 Southernport Developments supra note 1 para 17. Letaba Sawmills supra note 12 at
775–6.
14 Supra note 10.
15 Firechem ibid paras 35 and 37.
16 Ibid para 35.
17 1996 (2) SA225 (A).
18 Ibid at 233I–234A.
19 Ibid at 235C–D.
20 Ibid.
21 1987 (1) SA81 (A).
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then centred on whether a binding contract had been formed and whether
the respondent was entitled to its reliance expenditure.
Corbett JA, for a unanimous Appellate Division, used offer and acceptance
analysis to determine this issue.22 He held that the telex did constitute a
binding acceptance of the respondent’s offer.23 The appellant’s further
contention was that ‘a number of material and important matters relating to
the work to be performed under the contract were still being negotiated by
the parties’ and hence this telex was not binding.24 Corbett JA held, however,
that the existence of ‘outstanding matters’ did not necessarily deprive an
agreement of binding force.25 The judge of appeal held that the unambigu-
ous wording of the telex, the circumstances under which it had been sent and
the subsequent conduct of both parties indicated that it was a binding
acceptance.26 The respondents were awarded the full expectation interest
measure of damages.27 While this was not an instance of an agreement to
agree, it is a useful case in this context since it indicates that one can have a
binding agreement even if some issues still remain open for future negotia-
tion.
In Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd28 a contract
between the parties attempted to create a right to exploit a diamond mining
concession along the coast of Namibia. The parties signed a preliminary
‘Heads of Agreement’, a clause of which created a suspensive condition that
should a third party, who held part of the mining concession which the
agreement intended to exploit, not grant it an extension of this concession
after three years, the respondents would grant the appellants a right to exploit
a separate concession which it owned in South Africa on terms which were
to be agreed upon, but which were to be no less favourable than those of the
present agreement. With regard to the interpretation of this clause, the
majority decision of the Appellate Division was careful to state that
‘[b]usinessmen are often content to conduct their affairs with only vague or
incomplete agreements in hand’.29 Harms JA quoted an extract from the
House of Lords decision in Hillas and Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd30 to the effect that
the agreement should be interpreted so that the contract could rather be
upheld than that it should fail, in accordance with the well-known maxim ‘ut
res magis valeat quam pereat’.31 The clause in question, however, required
22 Ibid at 90–4.
23 Ibid at 90–1.
24 Ibid at 91–2.
25 Ibid at 92.
26 Ibid at 93–4.
27 Ibid at 95.
28 1997 (2) SA548 (A).
29 Ibid at 561 per Harms JA.
30 [1932]All ER 494 (HL), (1932) 147 LT 503.
31 Namibian Minerals Corporation supra note 28 at 562. The extract referred to
comes from the judgment of Lord Wright at 503–4 where he states: ‘It is, accordingly,
the duty of the court to construe such documents fairly and broadly, without being
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not only the fulfilment of a suspensive condition, but such fulfilment needed
also the consensus of the parties.32 It did not therefore give rise to an
enforceable option which contained further terms for negotiation; it was an
agreement to agree with many variables present.33 The court thus held the
clause to be void for vagueness.34
There are also cases which, although they do not contain a duty to
negotiate in good faith, still contain open terms. In NBS Boland Bank v One
Berg River Drive CC35 the Supreme Court of Appeal was concerned with a
power of a bank to vary the interest rate of a mortgage repayment unilaterally
in terms of a provision in the mortgage contract. It was held that this was not
a completely unfettered discretion, whereby a party could determine its own
prestation, but rather a discretionary power, the exercise of which had to
measure up to a standard of objective reasonableness.36 This standard was
referred to by the court as the ‘arbitrium boni viri’.37 In an aside the court
added that this limitation on the exercise of a contractual power could also
have been achieved by an application of ‘the modern concept of the role of
public policy, bona fides and contractual equity’.38
In Erasmus & others v Senwes Ltd & others,39 a power in an employment
contract to vary the terms of the agreement at the discretion of the employer
was held not to be an unfettered power, but also to be subject to the standard
of arbitrium boni viri and hence valid.40 What emerges from this line of cases
is that a unilateral power under a contract to determine future terms of that
contract is valid in SouthAfrican law, provided the exercise of that power can
be held accountable to a standard of objective reasonableness and does not
leave prestation to the completely unfettered discretion of one party alone.
As far as the present problem involves the enforcement of a duty to
negotiate open terms, a parallel can be drawn with the comparable issue of
contracts creating a right of first refusal. These typically leave the determina-
too astute or subtle in finding defects; but, on the contrary, the court should seek to
apply the old maxim of English law, verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat
quam pereat.’
32 Ibid at 567.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Supra note 9.
36 Ibid at paras 24–5. This view was, however, dismissed as incorrect and obiter by
the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA)
para 16.
37 I borrow the translation of ‘arbitrio boni viri’ as a ‘standard of objective reason-
ableness’ from Deeksha Bhana ‘The enforcement of pre-emption: a proposed new
form of specific performance’ (2010) 73 THRHR 288 at 291. Bhana adds that the
determination of this standard is informed by the values of the South African Consti-
tution. In Erasmus v Senwes Ltd supra note 9, Du Plessis J approved a translation of this
phrase as ‘the decision of a good man’, explained as ‘a reasonable decision’ (at 538).
38 NBS Boland Bank supra note 9 para 27.
39 Supra note 9.
40 Ibid at 537–8.
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tion of the sale price or rental payment open for discussion for a possible
future date when the grantor of the right of first refusal may wish to make an
offer to the grantee. A difficult issue in this type of case is whether the grantee
can enforce the right against the grantor and under what circumstances this
would be allowable. The issue is squarely in the realm of good faith
negotiation of open terms.
Consider the case of Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd,41 where a clause in
a lease agreement created a right of first refusal in favour of the lessee to
renew the lease for a further period of almost five years ‘upon such terms and
conditions and at such rental as may be mutually agreed upon’.42 This clause
was interpreted by the court as meaning that the terms and conditions are
those which the lessor would offer to other would-be lessees, should the
current lessee not exercise its right of first refusal and was therefore not void
for uncertainty.43 The lessor was in the circumstances obliged to make an
offer to the lessee, who would then have the election whether or not to
renew the contract.44 The court held as follows:
‘Poynton’s [the lessor] was accordingly under an obligation to offer Soteriou a
new lease of shop 18. Plainly any offer had to be one which was capable of
being turned into a contract by acceptance. It had therefore to state a rental and
any other terms and conditions which Poynton’s required. . . . Poynton’s was
not free to fix any rental it pleased. . . . Plainly Poynton’s must act bona fide.’45
This case thus creates a duty on the grantor of a right of first refusal to make
a bona fide offer to the right holder should she wish to sell or let the item in
question.46 Bhana takes it one step further and argues that a form of specific
performance should be available to the grantee, whereby, in the event of a
sale by the grantor to a third party, a court should be able to impose on the
grantor a duty to make an offer in favour of the grantee, determined
according to an objectively reasonable standard (‘arbitrio boni viri’).47
Whether or not Bhana’s arguments are accepted, the right of first refusal
41 1985 (2) SA922 (A).
42 Ibid at 929.
43 Ibid at 933.
44 Ibid at 933–4.
45 Ibid at 932H–J.
46 Luanda Hawthorne & Dale Hutchison ‘Offer and acceptance’ in Dale Hutchi-
son and Chris-James Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa (2009) at 72.
On the duties of the grantor of a right under a preference contract in general see
Bhana op cit note 25 at 292–5. This interpretation of the so-called ‘trigger event’,
which manifests the intention of the grantor to sell and thereby gives rise to a duty to
make an offer to the grantee, is disputed by Tjakie Naudé ‘The rights and remedies of
the holder of a right of first refusal or preferential right to contract’ (2004) 121 SALJ
636. Naudé argues at 646–7 that ‘nothing short of a valid offer to, or contract with a
third party should amount to breach by the grantor’. The grantor should be ‘left as
free as possible to negotiate with third parties in order to sound out the market and
ultimately to obtain the best price’. See also Tjakie Naudé ‘Which transactions trigger
a right of first refusal or preferential right to contract?’ (2006) 123 SALJ 461.
47 Bhana op cit note 37 at 301–2.
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analogy is illuminating in two respects: first, a duty to negotiate an agreement
at a future date is viewed as binding by the courts and has even been
interpreted as giving rise to a duty to make a bona fide offer. Secondly, the
courts in this context are grappling with how to enforce this positive
obligation, but the Appellate Division has held that such an obligation is at
least in principle enforceable.48
In sum, therefore, open terms are acceptable in South African law,
provided they are contained in a binding preliminary agreement and are
enforceable by some deadlock-breaking provision. The existence of a
preliminary agreement would obviously be a question of fact to be deter-
mined by offer and acceptance analysis. In the words of Corbett JA:
‘There is no doubt that, where in the course of negotiating a contract the parties
reach an agreement by offer and acceptance, the fact that there are still a number
of outstanding matters material to the contract upon which the parties have not
yet agreed may well prevent the agreement from having contractual force. . . .
The existence of such outstanding matters does not, however, necessarily
deprive an agreement of contractual force. The parties may well intend by their
agreement to conclude a binding contract, while agreeing, either expressly or
by implication, to leave the outstanding matters to future negotiation with a
view to a comprehensive contract. In the event of agreement being reached on
all outstanding matters the comprehensive contract would incorporate and
supersede the original agreement. If, however, the parties should fail to reach
agreement on the outstanding matters, then the original contract would
stand.’49
As illustrated above, courts prefer to give effect to the intentions of
business people and hold that a valid agreement exists, rather than to strike it
down for uncertainty. Hence open terms may give rise to a valid power, for
instance where they create an ability unilaterally to determine a rental price
or interest rate, provided the exercise of such power is objectively reasonable.
What is more contentious is whether such power to make an objectively
reasonable determination of the content of an agreement can be extended,
beyond the parties to that agreement, to a tribunal attempting to enforce a
duty to negotiate. Clearly a court would have to be careful not unacceptably
to limit freedom of contract by imposing an entirely new contract on the
parties. If the majority of the terms of a contract have been agreed upon,
however, surely it is not too big a stretch to determine a market-related term
such as a sale price or rental amount by objectively reasonable determination?
This type of argument draws on the implication in NBS Boland Bank that
good faith or public policy could stand as a limitation upon the exercise of a
power under a contract. Given the role which the Constitutional Court has
48 Soteriou supra note 9 at 935. See also Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres
(Pty) Ltd 1967 (3) SA 310 (A) per Ogilvie Thompson JA at 320F–G; Associated South
African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) at 907–8.
See also Naudé ‘‘The rights and remedies of the holder of a right of first refusal’ op cit
note 46 at 636–8.
49 CGEE Alsthom Equipments supra note 21 at 92.
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carved out for public policy in the more recent case of Barkhuizen v Napier,50
the ability of courts to achieve a fair result through adjudication of what is
objectively reasonable has been enhanced. In Barkhuizen the Constitutional
Court stated:
‘Notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness cannot be separated
from public policy. Public policy takes into account the necessity to do simple
justice between individuals. Public policy is informed by the concept of
ubuntu. It would be contrary to public policy to enforce a time-limitation
clause that does not afford the person bound by it an adequate and fair
opportunity to seek judicial redress.’51
This adds weight to the ratio in NBS Boland Bank that public policy could
limit the exercise of a contractual power by imposing a standard of
reasonableness on the person concerned. Furthermore, the implication of the
last sentence of the extract above is that public policy also binds a court in the
enforcement of contractual rights, so that a court should not enforce
contractual terms which are unfair or unreasonable. This has subsequently
been qualified by the Supreme Court of Appeal, however, so that enforce-
ment of a contractual term will only be limited if ‘a public policy
consideration found in the Constitution or elsewhere is implicated’.52 This
finding, in the Bredenkamp case, presents the latest instalment in the ongoing
saga of the movement of South African contract law toward more altruist
values.53 Ever since the demise of the exceptio doli generalis in Bank of Lisbon
and South African Ltd v De Ornelas,54 the role of equitable considerations in
South African contract law has been controversial.55 The general trend has,
however, been toward more substantive values and a concern for fairness
inter partes.56 This culminated in the Constitutional Court judgments in
Barkhuizen, which seemed to provide an overarching requirement of fairness
50 2007 (5) SA323 (CC).
51 Ibid para 51 per Ngcobo J.
52 Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 (4) SA468 (SCA) para 50.
53 Compare the discussion in Alfred Cockrell ‘Substance and form in the South
African law of contract’ (1992) 110 SALJ 40. The term ‘altruist’ is taken from Duncan
Kennedy ‘Form and substance in private law adjudication’ (1975–1976) 89 Harvard
LR 1685.
54 1988 (3) SA580 (A).
55 See particularly: Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO
1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v
Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); Gerhard Lubbe ‘Bona fides, billikheid en die open-
bare belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg’ (1990) Stell LR 7; Reinhard Zim-
mermann ‘Good faith and equity’ in Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser (eds)
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217; Dale Hutchison
‘Good faith in the South African law of contract’ in Roger Brownsword, Norma J
Hird & Geraint Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 213.
56 For example: Du Toit v Atkinson’s Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA893 (A); Sasfin v Beukes
1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Sonap Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A); the
minority judgment of Olivier JA in Saayman NO supra note 55, but see the criticism
of this judgment by the majority in Brisley supra note 55 and Afrox supra note 55;
Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) SA419 (SCA).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL280
JOBNAME: SALJ11 Part2 PAGE: 9 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Sat Jun 25 15:29:30 2011
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2011−Part2/02article
in contracting.57 This over-arching requirement was negated by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp, as set out above, which appears to
be where the matter rests at the moment.58
While altruist values are on the rise, however, the traditional notion of
good faith seems to have been abandoned as a vehicle for change in favour of
public policy.59 To say that there is no independent requirement of good faith
in South African contract law, however, is not to say that bad faith will be
condoned. While good faith may import an objective standard of fair dealing,
bad faith seems to suggest a more subjective standard. Indeed bad faith
conduct seems to imply something akin to deliberate conduct on the part of
the culprit. Should a court strike down bad faith conduct under a contract on
grounds of objective reasonableness and fairness?60
Compare in this regard the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in
South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd.61 Here SAFCOL was the
supplier of logs to a sawmill owned by York. The contract had been entered
into 30 years previously and contained a clause in terms of which the supplier
could raise the price of logs. SAFCOL was the successor to the South African
government as the supplying party under the contract. The price increase
mechanism was an agreement to agree in the future, but was able to be
referred to the relevant government minister, or even an arbitrator, to break a
deadlock. From the outset, however, York frustrated every attempt of
SAFCOL to raise the price. There was no provision for SAFCOL to escape
the contract and as a result it was locked into supplying logs at a price way
below market value. After all attempts to reach agreement failed, SAFCOL
ended up in the Supreme Court of Appeal, arguing (inter alia) that York was
in breach of an implied term to act in good faith.62 The Supreme Court of
Appeal held that such a duty of good faith did not exist, based on the
prevailing view of fairness in contracting at the time.63 The court expressly
57 See for example the quoted extract above which appeared in Barkhuizen supra
note 50 para 51, as well as the argument advanced by counsel in the SCA decision in
Bredenkamp supra note 52 para 26.
58 It should be noted that leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was denied to
the appellant, Bredenkamp, and hence the matter rests here.
59 See Barkhuizen supra note 50 paras 79–82, 120. The definition of good faith in
para 80 of the majority judgment seems to overlap with the definition of public policy
given at para 51. A clearer distinction is drawn between these concepts in Hector
MacQueen ‘Good Faith’ in Hector MacQueen & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds)
European Contract Law (2006) at 65.
60 See Graham Glover ‘Lazarus in the Constitutional Court: an exhumation of the
exceptio doli generalis?’ (2007) 124 SALJ 449 and A J Kerr ‘The defence of unfair
conduct on the part of the plaintiff at the time the action is brought: the exceptio doli
generalis and the replicatio doli in modern law’ (2008) 125 SALJ 241 to the effect that
Barkhuizen could be read as a resurrection of the old exceptio doli generalis defence,
which was aimed at invalidating bad faith conduct. This opinion was criticised by the
Harms DP in Bredenkamp supra note 52, however, in para 32.
61 2005 (3) SA323 (SCA).
62 Ibid para 26.
63 Ibid para 31.
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acknowledged that York had deliberately set out to frustrate SAFCOL’s
attempts to negotiate further, however.64 The result was that York was held
to be in breach of a duty not to frustrate SAFCOL in the exercise of its rights
under the contract.65 Although the existence of such a duty may have been
ambiguous in terms of the actual contract, the ‘underlying principles of good
faith’ required such an interpretation.66
The judgment in SAFCOL v York thus seems to imply a finding of bad
faith conduct on the part of York by the Supreme Court of Appeal. Such an
instance of bad faith, where a party refuses to negotiate with a counterpart
after a preliminary agreement containing a duty to negotiate in good faith at a
later date has been signed, or adopts stalling tactics deliberately to avoid
reaching agreement, could also be outlawed on constitutional grounds. One
could argue that the right to dignity,67 or even to fairness itself,68 has been
infringed. The issue of whether or not there was an enforceable duty to
behave in accordance with the dictates of good faith was not decided in
Barkhuizen;69 the focus was rather on the limitation of contractual freedom in
the interests of public policy. With a bit of development, good faith or some
other standard of objective reasonableness or fairness could, however, stand
as an important underlying basis for any development of the law in the
direction of enforcing a duty to negotiate in good faith.
Thus an objectively reasonable determination of an outstanding term
should be available as an optional power to a court faced with a failure to
negotiate in good faith. This would achieve for the parties what their failed
negotiations should have resulted in. Such a power would be underpinned
by the concept of good faith or public policy and this standard would inform
the notion of determining an objectively reasonable term.
There is no direct authority for this proposition in South Africa, absent
some sort of agreed upon deadlock-breaking provision. The preference
contract may constitute an apt analogy, however, since it creates a condi-
64 Ibid para 35.
65 Ibid para 33.
66 Ibid para 34.
67 Section 10 of the Constitution. Gerhard Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights
seriously: the Bill of Rights and its implications for the development of contract law’
(2004) 121 SALJ 395 discusses the tendency of the right to dignity to pull in two
directions in the context of contracts (at 420–1). On the one hand dignity requires
freedom of contract and ‘the autonomous capacity to structure [one’s] legal relations’
and on the other it ‘constrains’ individual autonomy. This second sense of the right to
dignity requires a contracting party to consider the circumstances and interests of his
or her counterpart.
68 For fairness as a constitutional value, see Bredenkamp supra note 52 para 27. See,
however, the same judgment in para 50, where Harms DP stated that he did not
believe that ‘the enforcement of a valid contractual term must be fair and reasonable
even if no public policy consideration found in the Constitution or elsewhere is
implicated.’
69 See Barkhuizen supra note 50 paras 79–82 and 120.
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tional agreement to agree and appears to be enforceable.70 Before formulat-
ing what could be a possible solution in the SouthAfrican context as to how a
duty to negotiate in good faith could be made enforceable, it is illuminating
to consider the position in comparative jurisdictions and in certain supra-
national bodies of contract law.
III COMPARATIVE LAW ON ‘DUTY TO NEGOTIATE IN
GOOD FAITH’ PROVISIONS
The issue of liability for breaking off contractual negotiations prior to
finalising a contract is an area about which a considerable amount has been
said in international jurisprudence. Germany has evolved a whole doctrine of
pre-contractual liability, known as culpa in contrahendo. This liability lies
somewhere between contract and delict and is today ‘rationalised as a
reliance-based relationship of ‘‘obligation imposed by law’’ ’.71 As regards a
pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith in particular, Lorenz states
that a party who wilfully causes damage to another in a manner which is
contra bonos mores is bound to compensate him in German law.72 He
qualifies this rule by stating that breaking off contractual negotiations will not
normally meet this stringent test.73 The Reichsgericht did, however, support
a few instances of such a claim based on culpa in contrahendo.74 Lorenz states
that this issue is less important in German law than in other systems, since an
offer is generally binding on the offeror, unless he has excluded the binding
effect thereof.75 This latter type of revocable offer is hence regarded as merely
an ‘invitation to deal’, upon which a party is unlikely to rely given its
unenforceable nature.76 A ‘contract to make a contract’ (‘Vorvertrag’) is
recognised, however, provided certain essentials of the future main contract
have been determined.77 Before the stage of a Vorvertrag has been reached, a
party is generally permitted to withdraw from negotiations, but not after.78
The Bundesgerichtshof has continued the trend of the Reichsgericht in
awarding reliance damages where a party ‘in the course of negotiations has
70 Compare Bhana op cit note 11.
71 Basil Markesinis, Hannes Unberath & Angus Johnston The German Law of Con-
tract (2006) 92. See also Arthur T von Mehren International Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law (1976) VII ch 9, 23–8; Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine ‘Culpa in contrahendo,
bargaining in good faith, and freedom of contract: a comparative study’ (1964) 77
Harvard LR 401; John M Zieff ‘Culpa in contrahendo — a prescription for the ills of the
SouthAfrican law of contract’ (1989) 52 THRHR 348.
72 Werner Lorenz ‘Germany’ in Ewoud H Hondius (ed) Precontractual Liability —
Reports to the XIIIth Congress, International Academy of Comparative Law (1990) 159 at
165. See also Markesinis et al op cit note 52 at 99.
73 Lorenz ibid at 165; Markesinis op cit note 71 at 99.
74 Ibid at 166. Lorenz cites the following decisions of the Reichsgericht: 24 Feb
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made the other party believe that a contract will certainly be concluded, but
then without good reason or from ulterior motives refuses to go ahead’.79
In the Netherlands the courts have used good faith in its objective sense
(redelijkheid en billijkheid) to impose on a negotiating party a duty to take
into account its opposing party’s reasonable interests.80 In Plas v Municipality
of Valburg81 a construction firm tendered for the building of a municipal
swimming pool. There was no official tender process, but the mayor and his
aldermen approved the proposal. The approval of the City Council remained
outstanding, however. The Council ultimately approved a different tender at
a lower price. The Hoge Raad held that where negotiations had reached the
stage where both parties could reasonably assume that a contract would
result, it would be against good faith to break off the relationship.82
In a case decided soon thereafter, the Hoge Raad held that where a
preliminary agreement existed, the parties could be compelled to negotiate in
good faith to finalise that agreement.83 Specific performance could be
awarded of the duty to negotiate in good faith.84 In this case, an outstanding
rental amount was supplied by the court to an otherwise complete prelimi-
nary agreement after a landlord had broken off negotiations.85 As far as
damages go, Van Dunné notes that Dutch courts are prepared to award the
expectation measure of damages in appropriate cases.86
Common law legal systems are equally illuminating. In English law there
have been attempts to make liability for breaking off negotiations fit under
the banner of enrichment.87 There are also suggestions that it should fall
under estoppel or tort law.88 As to the narrower issue of whether a duty to
79 Ibid. Lorenz cites the following decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof: 10 July
1970, NJW 1970, 1840 & 12 June 1975 NJW 1975, 1774. See also Markesinis et al op
cit note 71 at 100.
80 Arthur S Hartkamp ‘Judicial discretion under the new civil code of the Nether-
lands’ (1992) 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 551 at 557. Jan M Van Dunné
‘Netherlands’ in Ewoud H Hondius (ed) op cit note 72 at 227 cites Plas v Municipality
of Valburg Hoge Raad 18 June 1982, NJ 1983, 723 as the leading case in this regard.
81 Supra note 80.
82 The discussion of this case draws heavily on that of Van Dunné op cit note 80 at
230–231.
83 Koot BV v Koot BV Hoge Raad 11 March 1983, NJ 585 cited in Van Dunné op
cit note 80 at 231. Van Dunné discusses at 232–3 the further case of VSH v Shell Hoge
Raad 23 October 1987, NJ 1988, 1017 to the effect that the freedom to break off
negotiations may be barred once a certain stage in proceedings has been reached.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid at 234.
87 Regalian Properties Plc v London Docklands Development Corp [1995] 1 WLR 212;
William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 932; Cobbe v Yeaman’s Row
Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752. See Ewan McKendrick ‘Work done in antici-
pation of a contract which does not materialize’ in W R Cornish, Richard Nolan, J
O’Sullivan & G Virgo (eds) Restitution: Past, Present and Future (1998) 163; Michael
Furmston & G J Tolhurst Contract Formation (2010) chs 12 and 13.
88 McKendrick op cit note 87 at 186.
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negotiate in good faith clause is enforceable, the House of Lords has been
very clear that this is a negative:
‘[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotia-
tions. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own
interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. To advance that
interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw
from further negotiations or to withdraw in fact, in the hope that the opposite
party may seek to reopen the negotiations by offering him improved terms.’89
English law would thus seem to be a dead end for comparative study on a
duty to negotiate in good faith. Indeed the only authority for this proposition
is an obiter dictum from a speech by Lord Wright in Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos
Ltd90 which stated that provided there was good consideration, a contract to
negotiate may be enforceable, though perhaps only by means of an award of
nominal damages, ‘unless a jury think that the opportunity to negotiate was
of some appreciable value to the injured party’.91
Australian courts, by contrast, have been more willing to recognise a duty
to negotiate in good faith. The leading case in this regard is Coal Cliff
Collieries (Pty) Ltd v Sijehama (Pty) Ltd,92 the case cited by the South African
Supreme Court of Appeal in Southernport Developments.93 In this case the duty
to negotiate in good faith was found not to be part of a binding preliminary
agreement.94 It was encapsulated in a document headed, ‘Heads of Agree-
ment’, which in the opinion of Kirby P contained too many ‘blank spaces’ for
the court to enforce.95 For this reason the duty was not enforced. Kirby P did
approve the obiter dictum of Lord Wright in Hillas v Arcos mentioned above,
to the effect that parties who have bound themselves to negotiate in good
faith should be held to that promise, although he stated that the appropriate
remedy may be nominal damages only.96
There are also several academic opinions on the topic of a contract to
negotiate in good faith in Australia.97 These go further than Kirby P on the
issue of enforcement of such a duty, arguing for damages beyond a mere
nominal measure. In this regard, Paterson opined as follows:
89 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 at 138. This confirmed the decision in Courtney
& Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 297 and rejected the
obiter dictum by Lord Wright in Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 LT 503 at 515.
90 Supra note 89.
91 Ibid at 515.
92 Supra note 6.
93 Supra note 1.
94 Ibid at 27.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid at 25.
97 J W Carter & M P Furmston ‘Good faith and fairness in the negotiation of
contracts’ (1994) 8 Journal of Contract Law 1 and 93; Jeannie Marie Paterson ‘The
contract to negotiate in good faith: recognition and enforcement’ (1996) 10 Journal of
Contract Law 120; Ian B Stewart ‘Good faith in contractual performance and in nego-
tiation’ (1998) 72 Australian LJ 370.
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‘Generally the most appropriate measure of damages for breach of a contract to
negotiate in good faith may be damages for the ‘‘loss of the chance’’ to conclude
the negotiations successfully. Although the measure will, by definition, be
somewhat speculative, it is consistent with the contract’s purpose. Parties to a
contract to negotiate in good faith have contracted to reduce the risks of
negotiation and for an improved chance successfully to conclude negotiations
in a profitable transaction. In some cases, the possibility of ‘‘reliance damages’’
based on the plaintiff’s negotiation costs may alternatively be considered. Only
where no ascertainable loss can be shown on any of these bases will nominal
damages be appropriate.’98
Carter & Furmston, in a lengthy discussion of Coal Cliff Collieries and the
relevant House of Lords decisions, state:
‘It is hard to feel that the House of Lords produced really conclusive reasons
why parties who wish to assume mutual obligations to negotiate in good faith
should be denied the court’s support in such a perfectly reasonable endeav-
our. . . . There may be specific cases in which a court cannot give effect to such
a commitment, or where the damages are only nominal, but it is over simplistic
to assume all cases are of this kind.’99
The Australian courts and commentators seem to draw quite heavily on
American authorities in this regard. Kirby P in Coal Cliff Collieries noted that
far more cases of failed negotiation had come before American courts than
those of Australia or England and that this had given rise to a considerable
body of academic commentary in the United States, to which he referred.100
The leading case in the United States on liability for breaking off negotiations
is Hoffman v Red Owl Stores.101 Although this case did not involve a duty to
negotiate in good faith clause, it presents an interesting study in the issues
surrounding reliance on pre-contractual promises. This is a broader question
than where a preliminary agreement is present. In this broader type of
scenario there is as-of-yet no contract, meaning a plaintiff must rely on some
other cause of action when claiming reliance damages for bad faith conduct
on the part of his opposing party.
In this case Hoffman was given assurances by Red Owl Stores that if he
had a certain amount of capital he could set up a supermarket using its
franchise. He expended considerable sums and a large amount of time and
energy in reliance on these assurances, only to have Red Owl move the goal
posts at the last minute and require a greater capital contribution than he
could afford. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ultimately held Red Owl
98 Paterson op cit note 97 at 139.
99 Carter & Furmston op cit note 97 at 115.
100 Coal Cliff Collieries supra note 6 at 22.
101 133 NW 2d 267 (Wisconsin 1965). For a lengthy discussion of this case see
Robert E Scott ‘Hoffman v Red Owl Stores and the myth of precontractual reliance’
(2007) 68 Ohio State LJl 71.
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liable on the basis of promissory estoppel102 and awarded reliance damages to
Hoffman.103
In the Hoffman case there was no express ‘duty to negotiate in good faith’
clause, however. In a treatise on the subject, Farnsworth concurs that breach
of such a duty to negotiate in good faith should lead to a claim for reliance
damages, which appears to be a generally accepted view amongst commenta-
tors in the United States.104 Farnsworth cites Itek Corporation v Chicago Aerial
Industries105 as an example of a case involving a more concrete preliminary
agreement where a court was willing (at least in principle) to enforce a duty
to negotiate in good faith.106 Here the parties had signed a letter of intent to
sell the assets of CAI to Itek, which contained several terms, including the
sales price. A final contract was envisaged in this letter, but was never
completed. CAI then tried to back out of the deal. The Supreme Court of
Delaware held that CAI had breached this letter, ‘by wilfully failing to
negotiate in good faith toward the completion of the deal’.107 An outstanding
question, however, was whether on the facts the letter of intent constituted a
binding agreement.108 The court came to the conclusion that the letter did
not constitute a binding contract, but left open the question as to whether in
the event that Itek had been able to establish CAI’s liability it would be able
to proceed against its stockholders.109
Farnsworth also states that where there are open terms in an agreement,
the duty to negotiate further in good faith may be implied.110 He links this to
a discussion of an objective duty of good faith in negotiating open terms —
the duty of ‘fair dealing’ — which he claims extends to all such terms.111
Summers also describes various forms of bad faith conduct which can be
manifested at the negotiation stage of a contract, although he notes that good
faith conduct is not always enforced by the courts in this setting.112 This is
102 The basis of this finding was § 90 of the Restatement, Second, Contracts (1981).
103 Hoffman supra note 101 at 274–7.
104 E Allan Farnsworth ‘Precontractual liability and preliminary agreements: fair
dealing and failed negotiations’ (1987) 87 Columbia LR 217 at 255. See also Charles L
Knapp ‘Enforcing the contract to bargain’ (1969) 44 New York University LR 673 at
723; Alan Schwartz & Robert E Scott ‘Precontractual liability and preliminary agree-
ments’ (2006–2007) 120 Harvard LR 661 at 664–5.
105 248A2d 625 (Delaware 1968) at 629.
106 Farnsworth op cit note 104 at 265.
107 Itek supra note 105 at 628.
108 Ibid at 629.
109 Ibid at 630–1.
110 Ibid at 254–5. Farnsworth notes that this is not accepted in all states. An example
of a case supporting this proposition (which he cites) is Teachers Insurance & Annuity
Association of America v Butler 626 F Supp 1229 (New York 1987) at 1232. See also
Schwartz & Scott op cit note 104 at 664; Scott op cit note 101 at 98–101.
111 Farnsworth op cit note 104 at 268.
112 Robert S Summers ‘ ‘‘Good faith’’ in general contract law and the sales provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1968) 54 Virginia LR 195 at 220.
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echoed by Farnsworth, although he claims that a party may have an action for
restitution or misrepresentation under such circumstances.113
A synopsis of the United States law in this area shows certain broad trends.
Reliance damages may be available for failure to negotiate in good faith over
open terms, even in the absence of such an express clause in the contract.
Whether any measure of damages is available beyond this is debatable, but in
appropriate circumstances a party may be guilty of bad faith conduct for a
failure to negotiate in good faith. This may lead to a remedy of damages,
whether in contract, delict, estoppel or enrichment.
The final comparative excursus undertaken here will be into the realm of
supra-national contract rules, particularly the Unidroit Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts. Article 2.1.15 (Negotiations in bad faith) reads
as follows:
‘(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an
agreement.
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is
liable for the losses caused to the other party.
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue
negotiations when intending not to reach an agreement with the other
party.’
Comment 2 to this provision notes that a party’s right to negotiate must be
exercised in accordance with the duty of good faith and fair dealing
contained in art 1.7. This comment continues to the effect that liability for
negotiating in bad faith is limited to reliance damages, but states that if the
parties have expressly agreed on a duty to negotiate in good faith, all the
remedies for breach of contract will be available to them, including the right
to performance. Illustration four contains an example of a ‘pre-bid agree-
ment’between a contractor and a supplier, which includes a duty to negotiate
in good faith clause. If the contractor refuses to continue negotiations after
the award of the contract, the supplier may request enforcement of the duty
to negotiate in good faith.
Kleinheisterkamp notes that pre-contractual liability is a sensitive issue in
comparative law and that art 2.1.15 of the PICC ‘can hardly be said to restate
a general principle of law’.114 However, since the threshold for application of
the article is ‘bad faith’ he feels that this provision should be acceptable to
most countries.115 This more restrictive standard is preferable he feels to the
113 Ibid at 285.
114 Jan Kleinheisterkamp ‘Formation and authority of agents’ in Stefan Vogenauer
& Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds) Commentary on the Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (PICC) (2009) 215 at 300. Compare the discussion of English
law above, where the existence of a duty to negotiate in good faith is expressly
denied.
115 See the Opinion (31 January 2002) of theAdvocate General Geelhoed, Court of
Justice of the European Communities, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi Spa v Hein-
rich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH paras 55–63. This case is available at www.u-
nilex.info, accessed on 26 May 2010. Here Geelhoed takes art 2.1.15 as his starting
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phrasing of the equivalent provision of the Principles of European Contract
Law, which enforces a standard of good faith.116 As far as the enforcement of a
duty to negotiate in good faith goes, Kleinheisterkamp states as follows:
‘If a party does not make the efforts that a reasonable person would make to
overcome unforeseen obstacles in order to reach an agreement, it acts in bad
faith (as defined by the parties) and will be liable for the reliance damages of the
other party underArt 2.1.15(2). In contrast, specific performance in the sense of
sending the recalcitrant party back to the negotiating table is not possible (Art
7.2.2(d)).’117
Farnsworth echoes this interpretation that art 2.1.15 can give rise only to
reliance damages, based on the use of the word ‘losses’ in art 2.1.15(2).118 The
inclusion of ‘losses’ by implication excludes ‘gains’ which would entail the
expectation interest.119
In Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi Spa v Heinrich Wagner Sinto
Maschinenfabrik GmbH,120 a case heard in 2002 by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, the issue of liability for breaking off negotiations
was discussed. Advocate Geelhoed, who decided the case, discussed the
relevant law of several member states, but started with the provisions of
article 2.1.15 of the Unidroit Priniciples.121 The Tacconi decision thus seems
to accept the Unidroit provision as representing a compromise on the issue of
liability for breaking off negotiations prior to contracting.122 This is con-
firmed by the brief excursus of the German, Dutch, United States and
point for liability for breaking off negotiations, in a case involving European parties.
Kleinheisterkamp op cit note 114 at 300 interprets this use of the Unidroit Principles
as a view that they are general law acceptable to most parties. For a similar conclusion
see Olaf Meyer ‘The Unidroit Principles and their impact on European private law’
(2002) 7 Uniform LR 1222 at 1223.
116 Kleinheisterkamp op cit note 114 at 302. PECL Article 2:301 (Negotiations
contrary to good faith) reads as follows:
‘(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an
agreement.
(2) However, a party which has negotiated or broken off negotiations contrary
to good faith and fair dealing is liable for the losses caused to the other
party.
(3) It is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in particular, for a party to enter
into or continue negotiations with no real intention of reaching an
agreement with the other party.’
See Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds) Principles of European Contract Law Parts I & II
(2000).
117 Ibid at 305. Kleinheisterkamp adds in a footnote that Illustration 4 (discussed
above) is thus misleading when it states that the supplier ‘may request enforcement of
the duty to negotiate in good faith’.
118 E Allan Farnsworth ‘Duties of good faith and fair dealing under the Unidroit
Principles, relevant international conventions and national laws’ (1995) 3 Tulane Jour-
nal of International & Comparative Law 47 at 58–9.
119 Ibid.
120 Supra note 115.
121 Ibid at para 55.
122 See the views on this point set out in note 115.
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Australian law on point undertaken above. Hence, while hard bargaining is
permitted, bad faith negotiation is not. Similarly, reliance damages are
recoverable in appropriate circumstances, but the expectation interest is not.
It would also seem to be general that specific performance is not available as a
remedy for breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith. The English view that
no duty to negotiate in good faith can exist appears to be an isolated one, and
a general duty of objective good faith (or fair dealing) — or at the very least a
prohibition of bad faith conduct — seems to pertain to the negotiation of
contracts in most of the countries examined here.
The tendency of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal to draw on
foreign law in this area has been demonstrated by the extensive reference to
the Australian case of Coal Cliff Collieries in Southernport Developments. The
jurisprudence set out in this brief survey can now inform a discussion of
possible avenues of development of South African law on ‘duty to negotiate
in good faith’ clauses. The focus herein has been on methods by which such a
duty can be enforced in foreign law and this focus will now be brought to
bear on South African law. This paper will also attempt to show why South
African law is different to that of the jurisdictions discussed above and hence
why specific performance of a duty to negotiate in good faith clause should
be enforceable in our law.
IV ENFORCEMENT OF A DUTY TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD
FAITH IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
Freedom of contract remains a foundational value in the South African legal
system123 and its protection is in the interests of commercial growth. The
ability of a party to drive a hard bargain — and to threaten to withdraw from
negotiations prior to their completion to achieve this end — leads to sound
business practice and is attractive to potential investors. This freedom should
remain in commercial dealings and should not be unnecessarily fettered. To
this extent, the statement of the House of Lords in Walford v Miles (quoted
above) can be endorsed. Hard bargaining must be distinguished, however,
from bad faith conduct, which is not acceptable in South African law.124 The
Barkhuizen case sets a requirement of balancing the competing values of
contractual freedom and considerations of fairness against each other, so that
contractual terms which are unfair, unjust or unreasonable would be against
public policy and hence invalid.125 According to that case, public policy is
also aimed at doing ‘simple justice between individuals’.126 While the status
of an enforceable duty of good faith, to the extent that this represents
123 Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 50 para 57.
124 See generally Barkhuizen ibid, particularly paras 69–70; Breedenkamp v Standard
Bank of SA Ltd 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ); Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2009 (6)
SA 277 (GSJ); Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd supra note 52; Glover op cit note
55 and Kerr op cit note 55.
125 Barkhuizen supra note 50 paras 28–30, 51.
126 Ibid para 51.
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something different from public policy, remains uncertain,127 bad faith
conduct would quite clearly fall foul of the public policy rule as set out above.
While the Barkhuizen case was concerned with the validity of a contractual
term, rather than the negotiation of contracts, it would not be a major leap,
given the definition of public policy in that case, to outlaw bad faith conduct
during negotiations.
What remains therefore, given the generality of the Barkhuizen definition
of public policy, is to identify examples of bad faith conduct in the
negotiation phase. Article 2.1.15(3) of the Unidroit Principles gives the
example of entering into or persisting in negotiations without the intention
of reaching agreement. A South African case example of this type of scenario
would be SAFCOL v York as discussed above.128 The acceptance of a duty
not to frustrate SAFCOL’s attempts to adjust the price in that case, seems to
imply an endorsement by the Supreme Court of Appeal of branding York’s
conduct unacceptable. Although good faith formed a part of the basis of this
decision, the real problem was a deliberate avoidance by York of its
obligations. This type of deliberate intent seems to be the clearest example of
bad faith. A further example may be ‘the use of unlawful economic
pressure’129 in exploiting an advantage over an opposing party (a situation
commonly referred to as economic duress) to extract a favourable price or
terms upon renegotiation.
To attempt to impose an objective standard of good faith bargaining,
rather than outlawing bad faith, may, however, impinge upon legitimate hard
bargaining to too great an extent. Compare in this regard the instances which
Farnsworth identifies as bad faith: refusal to negotiate further, improper
tactics (in the sense of hard bargaining which is unreasonable), non-
disclosure of material facts (to the extent that there is a duty to disclose),
negotiation with third parties and reneging on promises already exacted.130
Several of these could well be defended as hard bargaining rather than bad
faith conduct. Clearly a distinction must be carefully drawn here and this
seems to rest, as in Unidroit’s example, on a deliberate intention to string the
other party along without intending to agree. Seen in this light, something
akin to dolus is required before bad faith can be said to be present. The same
would be true of a situation where economic duress is employed to achieve
favourable terms. Identifying an instance of bad faith conduct whether at the
performance or negotiation phase of contracting will ultimately be a question
of fact and this determination will be based on the general guidelines as to
what public policy entails in this setting. Given the notion of the freedom not
127 Ibid para 83.
128 See part II of this article above.
129 Graham Glover ‘Developing a test for economic duress in the SouthAfrican law
of contract: a comparative perspective’ (2006) 123 SALJ 285 at 285. See this article for
a helpful account of the doctrine of economic duress and an analysis of South African
and foreign cases in point.
130 Farnsworth op cit note 104 at 273–85. See also Summers op cit note 112 at
220–32.
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to contract,131 however, bad faith should be clearly demarcated from hard
bargaining.
A more difficult question in the context of a duty to negotiate is how does
a court make the leap from identifying bad faith negotiating tactics to
enforcing this duty on the recalcitrant party? Clearly this is a different
situation from that envisaged in Barkhuizen, since the contract terms are not
under threat. Rather the court is called upon to censure conduct. Nominal
damages, in the sense of providing a token to a party which has proven
breach, but has not been able to prove contractual loss are not available in
South African law.132 Thus the primary remedy envisaged by Lord Wright in
Hillas v Arcos and by Kirby P in Coal Cliff Collieries is unavailable to South
African litigants. This worthless remedy would in any event be a pyrrhic
victory to a party who has been denied the opportunity to contract by a bad
faith refusal of its counterpart to negotiate.
The obvious solution, if the court deems such conduct wrongful is to
award damages in delict. Here a party’s pre-contractual reliance could be
compensated if its counterpart breaks off negotiations in bad faith. No duty
to negotiate in good faith clause is then required, merely some sort of
representation by the defendant which gave rise to the plaintiff’s reliance. An
international example of such a case would be Hoffman v Red Owl Stores,133
discussed above.134 There is little South African authority on this point. See,
however, in the context of non-disclosure, the statements of Jansen J in
Meskin NO v Anglo American Corporation of SA Ltd135 that bad faith conduct
constituted fraud136 for which there was an action in delict137 and that the
duty of good faith extended into the pre-contractual phase.138
A case from the former Rhodesia, Murray v McLean NO,139 is more in
point. Here a manufacturer of prefabricated housing was offered a contract to
produce 52 houses for the government. The plaintiff manufacturer relied on
the representations of various government officials that the houses were
urgently required, spending money on materials as well as foregoing other
contracts. It later transpired that the relevant Ministry did not have sufficient
funds to pay for the houses and the contract was thus never finalised. The
plaintiff sued for its reliance damages based on negligent misstatement. The
131 See Bhana op cit note 11 at 582 who describes this as the corollary of freedom of
contract.
132 Christie op cit note 9 at 548; Schalk van der Merwe, L F van Huyssteen,
M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract — General Principles 3 ed (2007) 416.
133 133 NW 2d 267 (Wisconsin 1965).
134 It will be recalled, however, that the basis of the award of damages in this case
was promissory estoppel, rather than delict.
135 1968 (4) SA 793 (W). Compare the statement in Savage and Lovemore Mining
(Pty) Ltd v International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 (2) SA149 (W) at 198A–B.
136 Meskin NO supra note 135 at 802A–B.
137 Ibid at 798F.
138 Ibid at 804D.
139 1970 (1) SA133 (R).
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court held that the Executive must be free to act in the best interests of the
community when allocating public funds and that the plaintiff accordingly
had no right to rely on the representations of government officials.140 It was
held that the plaintiff had no cause of action and that its pleas therefore
failed.141
Despite the contrary finding in Murray v McLean NO,142 the delictual
action seems most appropriate in the absence of a binding preliminary
agreement to discourage bad faith breaking off of negotiations. An award of
reliance damages on this basis appears to be in line with most of the
comparative jurisdictions studied above.143 Given that pure economic loss is
actionable in the South African law of delict144 and this extends to negligent
misrepresentation,145 negative interest damages should be claimable in this
manner provided the elements of the delictual action can be proven.
Of course if there is a duty to negotiate in good faith clause contained in a
binding preliminary agreement, then a contractual remedy is also possible. It
seems to be clear that it is possible to claim reliance damages in contract.146
Thus a plaintiff may claim to the extent that he has altered his position to his
detriment in reliance on the contract, including consequential losses.147 Such
a claim may not, however, exceed the positive interest which the plaintiff
stood to make on the contract.148 This would also compensate the innocent
party for his out-of-pocket losses, following a breaking off of negotiations in
bad faith.
140 Ibid at 141A.
141 Ibid at 142B–D. This decision was approved by P Q R Boberg in the 1970
Annual Survey of South African Law 159–60. W H B Dean ‘Put not your trust in
princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help Psalm 146, Verse 3’ (1970) 87
SALJ 149 had a different opinion. Dean states (at 155–6) that as a matter of course
business people do enter into transactions based on trust and hence that in a case such
as this there should be a possibility of a delictual action. See also the discussion of this
area of the law in Dale Hutchison ‘Good Faith in the South African Law of Contract’
in Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context op
cit note 55 at 236–42.
142 Supra note 139.
143 Compare the Tacconi case supra note 115 para 76 whereAdvocate Geelhoed held
that under certain circumstances bad faith conduct at the negotiation stage of a con-
tract could constitute a delict or quasi-delict.
144 Hefer v Van Greuning 1979 (4) SA 952 (A); Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas
Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A); Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer
(Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA); J Neethling, J M Potgieter & J C Knobel Law of
Delict (2010) at 10 and 290; Max Loubser & Rob Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in
South Africa (2009) at 224–9.
145 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA824 (A).
146 Probert v Baker 1983 (3) SA 229 (D); Mainline Carriers (Pty) Ltd v Jaad Investments
CC 1998 (2) SA 468 (C); Gerhard Lubbe ‘The assessment of loss upon cancellation
for breach of contract’ (1984) 101 SALJ 616; Dale Hutchison ‘Back to basics: reliance
damages for breach of contract revisited’ (2004) 121 SALJ 51.
147 Hutchison ibid at 56.
148 Mainline Carriers supra note 146 paras 53–7; Lubbe op cit note 146 at 627.
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As to an award of expectation interest damages for failure to comply with a
duty to negotiate in good faith, in the sense of awarding foreseeable gains as
well as reliance based losses, this could be more problematic. Although a
binding preliminary agreement may have been concluded, the existence of
open terms may make it difficult to prove what the ultimate gains may have
been. It is no doubt for this reason that most foreign jurisdictions, with the
exception of the Netherlands,149 refuse to make such an award.
The safe answer to the enforceability question is thus that an action for
reliance damages should exist in the instance of bad faith conduct by the
recalcitrant party. Whether this action is in contract or in delict will depend
upon whether there is a binding preliminary agreement containing a duty to
negotiate in good faith. What this ignores, however, is the simplicity of the
remedy ultimately made in the Southernport Developments case. As long as
there was an arbitration provision in the contract, the court was safe to hold
that the open terms be resolved by this third party, secure in the knowledge
that it was not making a contract itself for the parties and thereby not
unacceptably impinging upon freedom of contract.
However, can the case law on fettering the exercise of unilateral contrac-
tual powers to an objective standard of reasonableness not be adapted to fit
this type of situation? Compare with this the strong suggestion that under a
contract of first refusal the grantor of the preferential right is obliged to make
a bona fide offer to the grantee should she form an intention to sell. In the
first context an open term is determined by reference to an external standard
by a party and in the second this is imposed on a party by a court.150 What if,
absent an arbitration clause, but in the presence of a binding preliminary
agreement containing an open term which is readily ascertainable by
reference to external standards, such as a market-related price, a court were
to order that the parties go away and agree on an independent arbitrator to
determine the outstanding term?151 As discussed above, this is similar to the
position enforced by the Hoge Raad of the Netherlands. Instead of the court
determining the outstanding term itself, which would perhaps be going too
far,152 it merely cures the omission of the parties to include a deadlock-
breaking provision.
Admittedly, this is a drastic step, but it would grant a tangible and credible
sanction to what is otherwise a toothless duty to negotiate. Furthermore, if
we are to accept that a failure to negotiate under these circumstances would
149 See the discussion in part III of this article above.
150 The agreement in Soteriou supra note 9 required a rental and possibly further
relevant terms and conditions to be fixed (at 929) and was held by the majority of the
Appellate Division to constitute a valid and enforceable right of first refusal (at 935A).
As such there was a binding preliminary agreement and no initial offer was required.
151 One might quote as authority here the cases on the exercise of a contractual
power arbitrium boni viri or those which state that a preference agreement may be
enforced by specific performance.
152 Compare the finding in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd supra
note 17 at 235C–D.
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amount to a breach of an enforceable contractual duty, this would enable the
enforcement of the innocent party’s right to specific performance, which is
the primary remedy for breach of contract in South Africa.153 If contractual
relief is to be given to the innocent party, it would be unusual to award him
damages alone, without resort to specific performance. Should the court
exercise its discretion not to award specific performance, the objectively
reasonable determination of the outstanding term would permit the quantifi-
cation of expectation interest damages as well. Seen in this light, a duty to
negotiate in good faith clause is enforceable, even in the absence of an
arbitration clause, provided the preliminary agreement in which it is
contained is binding and the open term(s) left to be negotiated are capable of
being resolved in this manner.
V CONCLUSION
Comparative study reveals that in some jurisdictions it has been accepted for
some time that liability for bad faith conduct stretches into the negotiation
phase, prior to the finalisation of an ultimate contract. In the common law
world, the United States and, to a certain extent, Australia accept this
principle. The exact doctrinal nature of the liability varies between jurisdic-
tions and is the subject of a certain amount of debate, but the availability of
reliance damages does seem to be established. Civil law countries adopt
different enforcement techniques but liability seems likewise to be recogn-
ised, certainly in Germany and the Netherlands. Indeed the generality of the
availability of damages for bad faith negotiation is demonstrated by the
inclusion of such a rule in Unidroit Principles.
In South Africa, damages for bad faith negotiation have not as yet been
firmly established. The aim of this article was to explore the law surrounding
a pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith, particularly as contained in
preliminary agreements. The Supreme Court of Appeal has clearly ruled that
such a clause is binding if it is accompanied by some sort of deadlock-
breaking provision, such as an arbitration clause. Also if the preliminary
arrangement in which such a duty is said to exist does not constitute a
binding contract, there is clear authority that no obligation to negotiate
further in good faith exists.
With regard to comparative law, it is easy to defend an argument that
reliance damages for bad faith breaking off of negotiations should be available
to an aggrieved party in South African law. The grey area in this regard is
where there is a binding preliminary agreement containing an open term or
terms as to, for example, a sale price or rental amount. Under such
circumstances a duty to negotiate in good faith should be enforced if
expressly included and perhaps even should constitute an implied term in a
preliminary agreement where it is not included. Should a recalcitrant party
persist in bad faith to refuse to negotiate at a later stage, this duty should be
153 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA776 (A) at 782–3.
AGREEMENTS TO AGREE 295
JOBNAME: SALJ11 Part2 PAGE: 24 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Sat Jun 25 15:29:30 2011
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2011−Part2/02article
enforceable upon him or her. A court should be able to compel such a party
to negotiate in good faith, perhaps even under threat of possibly appointing
an arbitrator to supply such an outstanding term. The arbitrator’s exercise of
this power would have to measure up to standards of objective reasonable-
ness and the term supplied would thus be such as would have been reached
had the negotiations proceeded in good faith. This will give a credible
sanction to the duty to negotiate in good faith and would ensure that the
dictates of public policy and fair dealing are realized.
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